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We compared 19,207 cases of SARS-CoV-2 vari-
ant B.1.1.7/S gene target failure (SGTF), 436 B.1.351 
and 352 P.1 to non-variant cases reported by seven 
European countries. COVID-19 cases with these vari-
ants had significantly higher adjusted odds ratios 
for hospitalisation (B.1.1.7/SGTF: 1.7, 95% confidence 
interval (CI): 1.0–2.9; B.1.351: 3.6, 95% CI: 2.1–6.2; P.1: 
2.6, 95% CI: 1.4–4.8) and B.1.1.7/SGTF and P.1 cases 
also for intensive care admission (B.1.1.7/SGTF: 2.3, 
95% CI: 1.4–3.5; P.1: 2.2, 95% CI: 1.7–2.8).
Here, we analyse coronavirus disease (COVID-19) cases 
infected with any of the three severe acute respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants of 
concern (VOC): B.1.1.7/S gene target failure (SGTF), 
B.1.351 or P.1. We compare them with cases reported 




In December 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) reported 
an emerging SARS-CoV-2 VOC classified as Pangolin 
lineage B.1.1.7 [1]. In the UK, and shortly thereafter in 
Denmark, B.1.1.7 infections increased rapidly. In par-
allel to the identification of B.1.1.7, increased whole-
genome sequencing (WGS) efforts globally led to the 
identification of further SARS-CoV-2 VOC, including 
B.1.351 (described in South Africa) or P.1 (originating 
in Brazil) [2-6]. While viral evolution is expected and 
has occurred since the discovery of SARS-CoV-2, these 
VOC were associated with higher transmissibility and 
severity as well as altered antigenicity with potential 
implications for acquired immunity or effectiveness of 
current vaccines compared with other circulating lin-
eages lacking particular defining mutations such as 
E484K, N501Y or del69-70 [7-12].
Reporting of SARS-CoV-2 variants in the 
EU/EEA
On a weekly basis, countries in the European Union 
and European Economic Area (EU/EEA) report data on 
COVID-19 cases to The European Surveillance System 
(TESSy) hosted at the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC). In response to the 
emerging VOC, ECDC implemented new reporting vari-
ables for variants on 24 December 2020 allowing retro-
spective data upload (Supplement A). COVID-19 cases 
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that do not have the VOC-defining mutations should be 
reported as non-VOC because of the complexity of the 
taxonomy of SARS-CoV-2. However, countries sequence 
only a minor proportion of all SARS-CoV-2 positive 
specimens (Supplement A, Figures S1 and S2 [6]).
We analysed data on COVID-19 cases infected with 
SARS-CoV-2 VOC (below referred to as B.1.1.7/SGTF, 
B.1.351 and P.1 cases) reported to TESSy for weeks 
38/2020 to 10/2021 by seven countries (Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Portugal) (Figure). Data included information on sex, 
age, clinical symptoms, pre-existing conditions, hospi-
tal and intensive care unit (ICU) admission and outcome 
(i.e. survived or died). The spike (S) gene deletion (del 
69–70) is present in multiple lineages including B.1.1.7 
and has been used for rapid screening using qRT-PCR 
(SGTF) because of a strong correlation between B.1.1.7 
cases and SGTF [13,14]. Portugal showed a > 90% cor-
relation between SGTF and B.1.1.7 cases and almost 
all (98%) of the SGTF cases included in this analysis 
came from Portugal (Figure). We therefore considered 
all SGTF cases as B.1.1.7 in our analysis [15].
We compared VOC cases caused by variants B.1.1.7/
SGTF, B.1.351 or P.1 to non-VOC cases which derived 
from the same surveillance system (Supplement A). 
Cases reported with missing or unknown information 
on the virus variant were excluded because an increas-
ing number of VOC cases with missing confirmation 
would be included in this group and introduce a bias 
when used as a reference category (Supplement A, 
Table S1 and Figure S3).
Proportions, medians and means were calculated and 
compared using chi-squared, rank sum and t-tests with 
a significance of p = 0.05 using STATA v16.1. Different 
logistic regression models, 1:1 matched (on 10-year age 
groups, sex and week of reporting, using conditional 
logistic regression) and unmatched (adjusted for age, 
sex, week and country, including having a pre-existing 
condition and healthcare worker status, using logis-
tic regression), were applied to assess differences in 
severity (hospitalisation, ICU and death) between VOC 
(B.1.1.7/SGTF, B.1.351 and P.1) and non-VOC cases.
Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 variants of 
concern
Of 3.2 million COVID-19 cases reported from the included 
countries during the study period (Supplements A 
and B), 23,343 had information on SARS-CoV-2 vari-
ants, of which 19,995 were VOC and 3,348 non-VOC 
cases included in this analysis. Among all cases with 
information on the variant, B.1.1.7/SGTF was the most 
Figure 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































S gene target failure
EEA: European Economic Area; EU: European Union; SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; VOC: Variant of concern.
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frequently reported VOC (19,207; 82.3%), followed by 
B.1.351 (436; 1.9%) and P.1 (352; 1.5%) (Table 1). Cases 
from Portugal accounted for almost half (9,740) of the 
reported VOC. VOC cases have been increasing since 
week 51/2020, with lower numbers in weeks 6 to 10 
probably caused by reporting delay (Figure). The male 
to female ratio differed slightly between the variants, 
ranging from 49% to 54% of male cases (p < 0.001) 
(Table 1).
The proportion of B.1.1.7/SGTF cases in the oldest age 
group decreased slightly over the reporting weeks 
(Supplement A, Figure S4). Our analysis showed that 
the proportion of cases in younger age groups (< 60 
years) was similar for VOC and non-VOC cases, with 
similar mean ages for B.1.1.7/SGTF, B.1.351 and non-
VOC but significantly older mean age for P.1 cases 
(Table 1).
Among the VOC cases with available information, the 
majority were domestic cases, with 1.5% of B.1.1.7/
SGTF and P.1 cases and 8.5% of B.1.351 cases reported 
as importations, compared with 0.4% of non-VOC 
cases (Table 1). Healthcare workers were slightly less 
represented among VOC cases than among non-VOC 
cases. The exception was P.1 with 19.8% of cases 
being a healthcare worker (Table 1). No COVID-19 case 
infected with a VOC was reported as pregnant.
Among the B.1.1.7/SGTF cases, 72.6% (5,365/7,390) 
were reported symptomatic, fewer than among the non-
VOC cases (81.4%; 547/672; p < 0.001), which in turn 
was lower than the proportion of symptomatic B.1.351 
cases (90.3%; 28/31; p = 0.2;  Table 1,  Supplement A, 
Figure S5). Cases of infection with P.1 with available 
information on this variable were too rare to allow a 
comparison with the other groups. The proportion of 
cases who reported any pre-existing condition was 
significantly lower among B.1.1.7/SGTF, B.1.351 and P.1 
than among non-VOC cases (p < 0.001;  Table 1). The 
lower likelihood of having pre-existing conditions was 
confirmed in the matched analysis for all VOC cases, 
with an adjusted odds ratio (aOR) of 0.08 (95% confi-
dence interval (CI): 0.07–0.1) for B.1.1.7/SGTF, an aOR 
of 0.57 (95% CI: 0.38–0.86) for B.1.351 and an aOR of 
0.02 (95% CI: 0.01–0.06) for P.1 compared with non-
VOC cases.
Differences in severity between VOC and 
non-VOC cases
A larger proportion of VOC cases were admitted to 
hospital (B.1.1.7/SGTF 11.0%; B.1.351 19.3%, and P.1 
20.0%; p < 0.001 for all VOC) and ICU (B.1.1.7/SGTF 
1.4%, p = 0.002; B.1.351 2.3%, p = 0.001 and P.1 2.1%, 
p = 0.005) compared with non-VOC cases (7.5%, hospi-
talised and 0.6% requiring ICU; Table 1, Supplement A, 
Figure S6). Of all hospitalisations with any VOC, 58.3% 
were male (646/1,108), which was comparable to non-
VOC cases (55.4% male; p = 0.4). Hospitalised B.1.1.7/
SGTF cases were significantly younger (mean age: 63 
years, median age: 65 years; p < 0.001) than non-VOC 
(mean: 69 years, median: 75 years) in contrast to 
B.1.351 (mean and median age: 67 years; p = 0.1) and 
P.1 cases (mean: 71 years, median: 76 years; p = 0.7) 
which were of a similar age as the non-VOC cases.
Both the matched and unmatched multivariable anal-
ysis found that B.1.1.7/SGTF, B.1.351 and P.1 cases 
had significantly higher odds of hospitalisation than 
non-VOC cases (aOR: 1.6–4.2 (matched) vs 1.7–3.6 
(unmatched)) (Table 2). In the unmatched analysis, 
B.1.1.7/SGTF, B.1.351 or P.1 cases were, respectively, 
2.3, 3.3 and 2.2 times more likely to be admitted to ICU 
than non-VOC cases.
In the age-stratified models, B.1.1.7/SGTF cases in the 
age groups 20–39 and 40–59 years had, respectively, 
3.0 and 2.3 times higher odds of hospitalisation when 
compared with non-VOC cases, while ICU admission 
or death did not differ significantly in any age group 
(Table 3). For B.1.351 cases, we observed 3.5–3.6 times 
higher odds of hospitalisation for age groups 40–59 
and 60–79 years compared with non-VOC cases of the 
same age. Admission to ICU was significantly more 
likely for B.1.351 cases (aOR: 8; 95% CI: 3.7–17.3) aged 
40–59 years. For P.1 cases, we observed between 3.0 
and 13.1 times higher odds of hospitalisation in the age 
groups 20–39, 40–59 and 60–79 as well as a 2.9–13.9 
times higher odds of ICU admission (40–59, 60–79 
and ≥ 80 age groups).
A total of 184 (2.2%) deaths were reported among VOC 
cases; B.1.1.7/SGTF (n = 155), B.1.351 (n = 17), and P.1 
cases (n = 12; Table 1), ranging in age between 41–99 
years. The matched and multivariable analysis did not 
show increased risk of death.
Ethical statement
Ethical approval was not required for this study, data 
are collected through national surveillance.
Discussion
This analysis outlines the characteristics of SARS-
CoV-2 VOC infections in seven EU/EEA countries and 
suggests a higher risk for hospitalisation, and also for 
ICU admission in age groups < 60 years for B.1.1.7/SGTF, 
B.1.351 and P.1. Similarly, Germany reported increased 
hospitalisation in age groups < 60 years following 
B.1.1.7 dominance [16]. Earlier, higher infection rates 
in younger, school-age age groups with subsequent 
infections across all age groups have been observed in 
the UK [7,9]. Higher odds of hospitalisation for B.1.1.7 
cases have also been reported by Denmark [8], but 
there is currently a lack of published data on severity 
for B.1.351 and P.1.
Overall, only a minor proportion of all SARS-CoV-2-
positive specimens are sequenced, however, both 
VOC and non-VOC cases presented in this analysis are 
derived from the same sampling frame. It is possible 
that sampling and sequencing were biased towards hos-
pitalised cases, which could lead to an overestimation 
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Table 1
Characteristics of reported SARS-CoV-2 VOC and non-VOC cases, EU/EEA, weeks 38/2020–10/2021 (n = 23,343)
Characteristics B.1.1.7/SGTF % B.1.351 % P.1 % non-VOC %
Totala 19,207 436 352 3,348
Sex
Female 9,700 50.5 211 48.4 179 50.9 1,541 46
Male 9,506 49.5* 225 51.6 173 49.1 1,807 54
Totalb 19,206 436 352 3,348
Age (years)
Range 0–103  0–109  2–101  0–105 
Median 39  42  46  38 
Mean 39  43  46*  40 
Standard deviation 21  22  25  21 
Age group (years)
0–19 3,730 19.4 60 13.8 79 22.4 569 17.0
20–39 6,005 31.3 147 33.7 66 18.8 1,195 35.7
40–59 6,151 32.0 139 31.9 107 30.4 986 29.5
60–79 2,538 13.2 62 14.2 58 16.5 390 11.6
≥ 80 783 4.1 28 6.4 42 11.9 208 6.2
Totalb 19,207  436  352  3,348 
Symptoms
No 2,025 27.4 3 9.7 2 33.3 125 18.6
Yes 5,365 72.6* 28 90.3 4 66.7 547 81.4
Totalb 7,390  31  6  672 
Pre-existing condition
No 10,608 55.2 89 20.4 254 72.2 369 11.0
Yes 8,599 44.8* 347 79.6* 98 27.8* 2,979 89.0
Totalb 19,207  436  352 3,348 
Hospitalisation
No 7,855 89.0 309 80.7 272 80.0 2,399 92.5
Yes 966 11.0* 74 19.3* 68 20.0* 195 7.5
Totalb 8,821  383  340  2,594 
ICU admission
No 8,593 98.6 380 97.7 332 97.9 2,553 99.4
Yes 121 1.4* 9 2.3* 7 2.1* 16 0.6
Totalb 8,714  389  339 2,569 
Mortality/outcome
Alive/ on treatment 7,490 98.0 309 94.8 295 96.1 1,773 96.0
Died 155 2.0* 17 5.2 12 3.9 73 4.0
Totalb 7,645  326  307  1,846 
Cases imported
No 6,143 98.5 107 91.5 263 98.5 694 99.6
Yes 93 1.5* 10 8.5* 4 1.5 3 0.4
Totalb 6,236  117  267  697 
Healthcare worker
No 11,985 94.3 358 92.7 85 80.2 2,425 92.0
Yes 730 5.7* 28 7.3 21 19.8* 211 8.0
Totalb 12,715  386  106  2,636
EEA: European Economic Area; EU: European Union; ICU: intensive care unit; SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; 
SGTF: S gene target failure; VOC: variant of concern.
a Total number of cases included in the analysis.
b Total number of cases for whom information was reported.
Totals for all included cases are given on top; totals for the individual characteristics refer to the cases for whom this information was 
reported.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Logistic regression for hospital and intensive care unit admission or death for cases with SARS-CoV-2 VOC B.1.1.7/SGTF 
B.1.351 and P.1 compared with non-VOC cases, EU/EEA, weeks 38/2020–10/2021 (n = 23,343)
VOC and age group
Hospitalisation ICU admission Death
aORa 95% CI aORa 95% CI aORa 95% CI
B.1.1.7/SGTF
0–19 years n = 1,860 n = 121
NRB.1.1.7/SGTF 1.0 0.4–2.7 1 Omitted
Pre-existing condition 1.0 0.2–4.3 1 Omitted
Healthcare worker 1.0 Omitted 1 Omitted Not included
20–39 years n = 3,167 n = 2,642
NRB.1.1.7/SGTF 3.0* 1.4–6.8 1.0 Omitted
Pre-existing condition 0.5 0.2–1.6 0.5 0.3–0.8
Healthcare worker 1.1 0.5–2.7 Not included Not included
40–59 years n = 3,017 n = 3,511 n = 2,546
B.1.1.7/SGTF 2.3* 1.0–5.4 2.1* 1.0–4.7 0.3 0.1–0.8
Pre-existing condition 0.7 0.1–3.1 5.4* 1.0–29.9 1.0 Omitted
Healthcare worker 0.4 0.2–0.8 Not included Not included
60–79 years n = 1,263 n = 1,490 n = 1,338
B.1.1.7/SGTF 1.7 0.9–3.4 1.7 0.8–3.8 0.7 0.4–1.2
Pre-existing condition 0.4 0.1–1.5 0.8 0.4–1.5 2.4 0.9–6.4
Healthcare worker 0.3 0.1–0.9 Not included Not included
≥ 80 years n = 565 n = 612 n = 526
B.1.1.7/SGTF 1.2 0.6–2.3 1.1 0.3–4.2 0.4 0.2–1.0
Pre-existing condition 0.2 0.0–3.3 0.4 0.0–16.3 1.4 0.9–2.0
Healthcare worker 1.0 Omitted Not included Not included
B.1.351
0–19 years n = 504
NR NRB.1.351 2.5 0.7–9.1
Pre-existing condition 0.4 0.1–1.2
Healthcare worker 1.0 Omitted Not included Not included
20–39 years n = 894
NR NRB.1.351 3.0 0.7–12.4
Pre-existing condition 2.8 0.7–11.6
Healthcare worker 1.0 Omitted Not included Not included
40–59 years n = 869 n = 398 n = 442
B.1.351 3.5* 2.5–5.1 8.0* 3.7–17.3 1.0 Omitted
Pre-existing condition 0.7 0.3–1.6 1.0 Omitted 1.0 Omitted
Healthcare worker 0.2 0.0–2.0 Not included Not included
60–79 years n = 337 n = 313 n = 236
B.1.351 3.6* 1.1–11.9 2.0 0.7–6.0 1.8 0.7–4.8
Pre-existing condition 0.7 0.4–1.5 1.0 Omitted 1.0 Omitted
Healthcare worker 0.2 0.0–1.1 Not included Not included
≥ 80 years n = 215 n = 198 n = 168
B.1.351 4.1 0.8–20.4 4.3 0.6–33.1 1.0 0.3–2.9
Pre-existing condition 1.0 Omitted 1.0 Omitted 1.0 Omitted
Healthcare worker 1.0 Omitted Not included Not included
aOR: adjusted odds ratio; CI: confidence interval; EEA: European Economic Area; EU: European Union; ICU: intensive care unit; NR: no result; 
SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; SGTF: S gene target failure; VOC: variant of concern.
a Adjusted for reporting country (seven clusters), sex and week of reporting.
* indicates significance (p < 0.05).
Analysis stratified by age group and adjusted for sex, country and week of reporting. n indicates the number of total cases included in the 
analysis for each age group (B.1.1.7/SGTF, B.1.351 or P.1 as well as non-VOC cases); Omitted variable, no 95% CI calculated.
7www.eurosurveillance.org
of the risk; however, this would be the same for non-
VOC cases included in the analysis. Reporting of 
variant cases is likely to be affected by both under-
reporting and reporting delay, as WGS efforts take 
time (≥ 3 weeks), but countries are setting up system-
atic sampling for WGS monitoring of the circulation 
of emerging VOC (Supplement A) [17,18].  Supplement 
B  presents a summary of B.1.1.7 and SGTF cases and 
of all COVID-19 cases including those with unknown 
or missing variant information as well as the logistic 
regression models comparing all non-VOC cases and 
those with missing/unknown information (possibly 
including unconfirmed B.1.1.7 cases), indicating also 
potential higher mortality associated with B.1.351 and 
P.1. Data were included until week 10/2021 and this 
may have been too soon after the introduction of these 
VOC into EU/EEA countries to detect higher mortality as 
observed in countries not included in this analysis for 
B.1.1.7 [8-10]. Also, information about hospitalisation, 
ICU admission and outcome may not have been avail-
able for the most recently infected cases. Although 
testing for variant viruses in December 2020 mainly tar-
geted travellers from affected countries and their con-
tacts, only a minority of cases in our analysis for whom 
data was available for the study period were reported 
as importations. Testing of contacts of travellers or tar-
geted testing in schools or workplaces generally or in 
response to outbreaks could also explain higher detec-
tion rates in younger age groups. Finally, the pooling of 
SGTF cases with B.1.1.7 cases could have led to some 
misclassification, despite evidence of high correlation 
between these cases. However, a small minority of 130 
such cases had information on hospitalisation, which 
makes it unlikely that they had substantially impacted 
the severity outcomes.
Conclusion
We show an increased risk for hospitalisations and ICU 
admission associated with the SARS-CoV-2 variants 
B.1.1.7/SGTF, B.1.351 and P.1, also in middle-aged indi-
viduals, which underlines the necessity to rapidly reach 
high levels of vaccine coverage and adhere to public 
health measures to reduce SARS-CoV-2 incidence and 
prevent severe cases. Enhanced testing and contact 
tracing implemented with a special focus on cases with 
VOC are also measures to reduce spread.
VOC and age group
Hospitalisation ICU admission Death
aORa 95% CI aORa 95% CI aORa 95% CI
P.1
0–19 years n = 453
NR NRP.1 1.0 Omitted
Pre-existing condition 0.6 0.2–2.2
Healthcare worker 1.0 Omitted Not included Not included
20–39 years n = 811
NR NRP.1 13.1* 6.5–26.5
Pre-existing condition 2.7 1.2–6.1
Healthcare worker 1.0 Omitted Not included Not included
40–59 years n = 787 n = 363 n = 442
P.1 3.0* 1.5–5.8 6.8* 2.4–19.6 1.0 Omitted
Pre-existing condition 0.5 0.2–1.0 1.0 Omitted 1.0 Omitted
Healthcare worker 0.1 0.0–1.7 Not included Not included
60–79 years n = 294 n = 340 n = 267
P.1 3.7* 1.9–7.0 2.9* 1.6–5.4 1.6 0.8–3.2
Pre-existing condition 0.9 0.5–1.6 1.5 0.6–4.0 7.7 3.0–19.6
Healthcare worker 0.2 0.0–1.1 Not included Not included
≥ 80 years n = 191 n = 183 n = 176
P.1 1.5 0.8–2.6 13.9* 2.1–89.4 1.3 0.6–3.0
Pre-existing condition 1.0 Omitted 1.0 Omitted 3.7 3.4–4.0
Healthcare worker 1.0 Omitted Not included Not included
aOR: adjusted odds ratio; CI: confidence interval; EEA: European Economic Area; EU: European Union; ICU: intensive care unit; NR: no result; 
SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; SGTF: S gene target failure; VOC: variant of concern.
a Adjusted for reporting country (seven clusters), sex and week of reporting.
* indicates significance (p < 0.05).
Analysis stratified by age group and adjusted for sex, country and week of reporting. n indicates the number of total cases included in the 
analysis for each age group (B.1.1.7/SGTF, B.1.351 or P.1 as well as non-VOC cases); Omitted variable, no 95% CI calculated.
Table 3b
Logistic regression for hospital and intensive care unit admission or death for cases with SARS-CoV-2 VOC B.1.1.7/SGTF 
B.1.351 and P.1 compared with non-VOC cases, EU/EEA, weeks 38/2020–10/2021 (n = 23,343)
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